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CRIMINAL LAW
John S. Baker, Jr. *
DEFINITION OF CRIME-VAGUENESS; PROOF
OF "UNLAWFUL PURPOSE"
Unlike the Model Penal Code,' Louisiana's Criminal Code does not
generally use the term "purpose" to designate one of the culpable states
of mind. 2 Rather, Louisiana's code categorizes culpability in terms of
criminal intent 3-general and specific-and criminal negligence. 4 Some
statutes also include a special knowledge requirement, e.g., possession
of stolen things.' The term "purpose," however, does appear in the
simple kidnapping statute which, inter alia, proscribes "[tihe intentional
taking, enticing or decoying away, for an unlawful purpose, of any
child not his own and under the age of fourteen years, without the
consent of its parent or the person charged with its custody .... ',6
The statute's use of the term "unlawful purpose" is discussed in an
attempted simple kidnapping case, State v. Gill.7
In Gill, a stranger approached two young boys, engaged them in
conversation, bought them soft drinks, and eventually " 'begged' them
to get into his car .... ,I When they refused and ran away, he followed
them and was apprehended by the police, who had been alerted by the
boys. Gill "admitted that rhe intended to take the boys to his home
'for a little while,' which he later explained to mean a 'few days.' "9
He also admitted to having previously taken other young boys to his
home. If common sense inferences are entitled to any weight, the con-
clusion is compelling that Gill intended something improper with the
young boys. He contended, however, that the statute was unconstitu-
tionally vague because "the phrase 'unlawful purpose' fails to give fair
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
• Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Official Draft 1962).
2. See La. Criminal Code: La. R.S. 14:8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as La. Crim.
Code].
3. La. Crim. Code arts. 10-11.
4. La. Crim. Code art. 12.
5. La. Crim. Code art. 69 (Supp. 1984).
6. La. Crim. Code art. 45(A)(2) (emphasis added).
7. 441 So. 2d 1204 (La. 1983).
8. Id. at 1205.
9. Id.
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notice to a reasonable person of the conduct which is prohibited."' 0 He
also contended that the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he acted with an intent to decoy the boys away for an
"unlawful purpose." The court disagreed on both points.
The vagueness claim involved the uncertainty of the term "unlawful
purpose." If not limited to purposes which are criminal, the term
arguably gave the defendant inadequate notice of what, besides criminal
purposes, constitutes "unlawful purposes." If the court had narrowed
its interpretation of the term to include only criminal purposes, then
the defendant would not have had a constitutional vagueness claim
because reference to other criminal statutes would have given him fair
notice." The court suggested (after the fact) in a footnote that the
unlawful purpose in this case was an intent to imprison falsely or to
contribute to the deliquency of a minor, both of which are criminal
acts.12 Yet, in the body of the opinion the court did not take the position
that the evidence had proven beyond a reasonable doubt either of these
criminal purposes. Instead, the court stated that the statute gave adequate
notice "[wihether the statutory term means a purpose violative of a
prohibitory law . . . or one merely disapproved by law . . . ."" The
court thereby avoided construing the term "unlawful purpose." In ad-
dressing the sufficiency of the evidence, however, the court read the
statute to require the prosecution to prove only "the absence of any
lawful purpose," rather than proving any particular "unlawful pur-
pose.' ' 4 By minimizing the state's burden of proof, the court produced
the same effect as it would have by construing the term "unlawful
purpose" to encompass more than criminal purposes.
The proof problem involves the statute's uncertain mens rea. The
simple kidnapping statute requires proof of a general intent insofar as
it specifies the "intentional taking, enticing or decoying away . ... 1
By adding that the taking, etc. must be for an "unlawful purpose,"
the draftsmen appear to have added a specific intent requirement, except
10. Id. at 1206.
11. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 500-01, 102 S. Ct.
1186, 1194-95 (1982).
12. The court stated:
Defendant's holding the children at his home against their will would constitute
a false imprisonment. See La. R.S. 14:46. His enticing and encouraging them
to "remain away" from their home without the consent of their parents would
also constitute a violation of La. R.S. 14:92 A(8). Hence, defendant admitted
that his "purpose" was unlawful, in that it would fall within the scope of
prohibitory stautes proscribing false imprisonment and contributing to the de-
linquency of minors.
441 So. 2d at 1207 n. 7.
13. Id. at 1206.
14. Id. at 1207.
15. La. Crim. Code art. 45 (emphasis added).
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that the usual language of specific intent is specifically avoided. 16 The
definition of specific intent requires "the offender [to have] actively
desired the prescribed criminal consequences .... ,,17 Proof of the
desired "criminal consequences" is statutorily confined to those pros-
cribed by the legislature as criminal. 8 If the language of the simple
kidnapping statute is meant to require specific intent, the prosecution
should have to prove that the intended purpose was criminal. Possible
criminal purposes which come to mind include false imprisonment, 9
carnal knowledge of a juvenile,20 and contributing to the delinquency
of a juvenile.2 If, however, the statute enumerated these purposes or
the prosecution designated one or more of these particular criminal
purposes, the prosecution would have great difficulty establishing that
the defendant, in fact, specifically desired any particular criminal con-
sequence, especially in a case of an attempt such as Gill.
The court follows what appears to have been the reason the leg-
islature included the words "unlawful purpose"-to exclude from crim-
inality those instances when a person, without consent of the parent,
takes a child into temporary custody for protection of the child or some
other perfectly "lawful purpose." The defendant's admissions in this
case negate any such lawful purpose. 22 Requiring only that the state
negate any lawful purpose by the defendant, however, effectively seems
to lighten the burden of proof on the prosecution. By not requiring
proof of a particular intended purpose, but instead leaving this issue
to conjecture, the statute appears to impute to the defendant an unlawful
purpose. Whether this imputation of an element of the offense has the
effect of shifting to the defendant the burden of going forward with
the evidence, which is constitutionally permissible, or shifts the burden
of persuasion, which is not, the opinion does not discuss. 23
The state's burden of proving all the elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt applies equally to the element of "unlawful purpose."
If the statute had used the term "illegal" or the court had construed
16. See La. Crim. Code art. 11 & comments. Compare the simple kidnapping statute,
La. Crim. Code art. 45, with the aggravated kidnapping statute, La. Crim. Code art. 44
(Supp. 1984), which prohibits doing certain acts "with the intent thereby to force the
victim, or some other person, to give up anything of apparent or prospective value, or
to grant any advantage or immunity, in order to secure a release of the person under
the offender's actual or apparent control .... ".(emphasis added).
17. La. Crim. Code art. 10(l).
18. La. Crim. Code art. 9.
19. La. Crim. Code art. 46. However, as the comments indicate, false imprisonment
is intended to apply to cases not covered by the kidnapping statute.
20. La. Crim. Code art. 80 (Supp. 1984).
21. La. Crim. Code art. 92 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
22. See supra text accompanying note 9.
23. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). For a discussion
of criminal law doctrine and statutes which impute criminal liability, see generally Robinson,
Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 609 (1984).
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the term "unlawful" to include only those acts proscribed by the criminal
law, the problem of notice to the defendant would have been satisfied.
The problem of proof for the prosecution, however, would have been
more difficult. Gill resolves the case in a way that answers these questions
to the benefit of the prosecution. In doing so, the court gives appropriate
weight to common sense inferences that a stranger who attempts to gain
custody of a juvenile is acting in a way that is "presumptively" unlawful.
Although the language of "presumption" also carries with it constitu-
tional problems related to the burden of proof,2 4 constitutional con-
straints do not preclude all statutes which allow the jury to draw common
sense inferences.25 The court allowed the jury to do so, in effect, by
construing the term "unlawful" to include more than that which has
been legally proscribed. While purporting not to decide the issue, the
court assumes for proof purposes and, therefore for all practical pur-
poses, the validity of the notion that certain acts, though not prohibited
as "criminal," can nevertheless be known to be "unlawful" "because
they are immoral or because they are against public policy."
'26
FIRST DEGREE MURDER-INTENT TO KILL MORE THAN ONE PERSON
An interesting question addressed in State v. Andrews27 is whether
a defendant who kills only one person under circumstances that do not
immediately endanger anyone else can be guilty of first degree murder
on the basis of "a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm
upon more than one person .... ,,28 The pertinent part of the first
degree murder statute does not require that the defendant have actually
killed more than one person. It clearly applies in the case, for instance,
of a defendant who shoots at more than one person in a single episode,
but succeeds in killing only one. When, however, a defendant fires at
only one person, the evidence would not ordinarily indicate an intent
to kill more than one person. It is not inconceivable, however, that a
person might clearly state his intention to kill more than one person,
but only have the opportunity to shoot at one person. In such a case,
where a second person was not in immediate danger, the supreme court
in State v. Andrews has ruled that the evidence was insufficient to
24. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970) (due process
clause requires proof "beyond reasonable doubt" of every essential element of the crime
charged); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1892 (1975) (state
statute which required defendant to negate a presumption of malice held unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1979).
26. 441 So. 2d at 1206 n.5 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary). The court also cites
State v. Bulot, 175 La. 21, 25, 142 So. 787, 788 (1932), as support for this broader
concept of "unlawfulness."
27. 452 So. 2d 687 (La. 1984).
28. La. R.S. 14:30(3) (Supp. 1984).
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establish the intent to kill or to do great bodily harm to more than
one person.
In its analysis the court did more than simply rule that there had
been insufficient evidence in this case; in effect, it read the statute to
require evidence of something in addition to the intent to kill more than
one person. The record in Andrews included considerable evidence of
a specific intent to kill more than one person. The defendant had
quarrelled with two persons who were brothers and left to get a gun.
Returning with the gun, he chased off one of the brothers, found and
killed the other brother, then attempted to find the one whom he had
chased shortly before. Both before and after killing the one brother,
he stated quite clearly his intent to kill both.2 9 The evidence of specific
intent to kill more than one person was unequivocal. Nevertheless, the
lack of a second shot or an attempted second shot endangering the
second victim at the time of the actual killing apparently troubled the
court. As Justice Lemmon discussed in dissent, however, the majority
incorrectly assumed the necessity for evidence of an additional act or
the imminence of harm to a second person.
Although intent is an element of a crime distinct from the act which
must be proven as a fact, the evidence of the act often serves as proof
for both the act and intent elements of the crime. Nevertheless, an act
that would actually kill is not always necessary to prove intent to kill.
Thus in a conspiracy to murder and in some attempted murders the
intent to kill may be evident even in the absence of an act immediately
aimed at death.30 The pertinent part of the first degree murder statute
in fact requires no second act; nor does it require the evidence of danger
to a second person. The act required by the statute is the act of a
killing one person, which the defendant had accomplished in this case.3'
What distinguishes this kind of first degree murder from second degree
murder is not an additional act requirement, but an additional intent
requirement. It is one thing to recognize as an evidentiary matter that
a second act, or imminent danger to a second person, may be necessary
to prove an intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm on more than
one person in the absence of clear statements of intent. The text of the
statute, however, does not justify reading such a requirement into the
statute itself.
29. "He asked for a gun and told his girl friend's mother and sister that he intended
to kill both the Anderson brothers. . . . He told police that he intended to 'get' both
brothers." 452 So. 2d at 688.
30. It is possible to prove an attempted murder, for example, in cases in which the
defendant is not even close to completing the crime. The Louisiana attempt statute, La.
Crim. Code art. 27(B), provides that "lying in wait with a dangerous weapon with the
intent to commit a crime, or searching for the intended victim with a dangerous weapon
with the intent to commit a crime, shall be sufficient to constitute an attempt to commit
the offense intended."
31. 452 So. 2d at 689-90 (Lemmon, J., dissenting).
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As discussed below the misreading of this part of the first degree
murder statute may have little practical impact. Unfortunately, however,
the court also gave a distorted reading to the article defining specific
intent in the course of justifying its strained reading of the statute. 32
The court quoted the intent statute with emphasis as follows: "that state
of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender
actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act.' 3
The court suggested that there can be no evidence of specific criminal
intent unless the act which would produce the criminal consequences
has actually been performed. "Firing at and killing Patrick is the act
which produced the 'prescribed criminal consequence.' Based on this
record, no rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that Andrews, by firing at Patrick, actively intended to
kill both Patrick and Joel." '3 4 Again the court confused the act and
intent requirements.
It appears that while the jury sentenced this defendant to life im-
prisonment, the court may have wished to give a narrow reading to the
first degree murder statute since it carries a possible death penalty.35
Even without such a reading, defendants in similar circumstances have
other protection because what the court injects into the first degree
murder statute is already included in the sentencing hearing statute, Code
of Criminal Procedure article 905.4. In the sentencing hearing the state
must establish certain aggravating circumstances to justify the death
penalty. Although the aggravating circumstances generally track the lan-
guage of the first degree murder statute, the aggravating circumstance
which corresponds to intent to kill more than one person is worded
differently. The sentencing statute requires that "the offender knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person. 3 6
It may be that the jury in this case returned the life imprisonment
sentence because it did not believe that the defendant was sufficiently
near to the second intended victim in this case to create the required
risk. In any event, the result as to this defendant reduces the conviction
from first to second degree murder, but has no effect on the sentence.
The impact of the case in a future similar situation would be to eliminate
the sentencing hearing. In the course of relieving some few defendants
from the risk that the jury might improperly apply the sentencing hearing,
however, the court has given a tortured reading to the pertinent part
of the first degree murder and specific intent statutes.
32. La. Crim. Code art. 10.
33. 452 So. 2d at 689.
34. Id. (footnotes ommitted).
35. See 452 So.2d at 689 n.2.
36. La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.4(d) (emphasis added).
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FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER-CAUSATION AND
CONCURRENCE
It is a general requirement of criminal law that an act and intent
must concur to produce the proscribed criminal consequences?17 Con-
necting these different elements in a criminal homicide can present
problems of concurrence or causation. Even though the act, the intent,
and other circumstances may concur, the defendant's responsibility for
the resulting death may be in doubt, thus raising an issue of causation.
In homicides which also involve aggravated felonies,"8 it may be difficult
to distinguish whether doubts about the connection between the felony
and the homicide involve an issue of concurrence or of causation. In
the context of Louisiana's first and second degree murder statutes, the
distinction between the issues of concurrence and causation turns largely
on whether the defendant had a specific intent to kill or to do great
bodily harm.
The supreme court's opinion in State v. Shilling3 9 a first degree
murder case, exemplified the confusion over the necessary connection
between a killing and the aggravating circumstance of armed robbery.
The defendant and another male robbed, beat, stabbed, and left the
victim for dead in a deserted area. The two robbers later returned to
retrieve a knife and discovered that the victim was still alive. Putting
the victim in their automobile, they drove further down the road to a
more secluded area, where they beat and slit the throat of the victim.
The court quite properly refused to accept the argument that the robbery
and the final killing were distinct incidents. Relying on State v. Anthony4°
and State v. West,41 the court found it reasonable to view the armed
robbery as not being concluded until the defendant and his companion
"to avoid detection or simply to reclaim the knife for future use, made
off with the knife they used to murder and rob the victim." '42
The court did not distinguish Anthony, a first degree murder case,
from West, a second degree felony murder case. 43 West, although not
37. R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 932 (3d. ed. 1982); W. Lafave & A. Scott,
Criminal Law § 34, at 237 (1972).
38. Aggravated kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape,
aggravated burglary, armed robbery, or simple robbery. See La. Crim. Code art. 30
(Supp. 1984); La. Crim. Code art. 31.
39. 440 So. 2d 110 (La. 1983).
40. 427 So. 2d 1155 (La. 1983); discussed in Baker, Developments in the Law,
1982-1983-Criminal Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 279, 296-99 (1983).
41. 408 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1982); discussed in Baker, Developments in the Law,
1981-1982-Criminal Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 361, 373-374 (1982).
42. 440 So. 2d at 113.
43. See discussion in Baker, supra note 40, at 296-99; Baker, supra note 41, at 373-
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addressed by the court in such terms, involved the issue of causation.
The connection between the felony and the killing concerned not only
the concurrence between a criminal act and the equivalent of a mens
rea, but also the causal relation between these and the death. Neither
Anthony nor Schilling involved a problem of causation, but involved
an issue of the concurrence between the killing and the attendant cir-
cumstances, viz., an aggravated felony. In Schilling the issue was not
the defendant's liability for the death, as it would be if the issue were
one of causation, but the degree of criminal homicide. In this case the
state had clearly proven specific intent to kill. If the court had determined
that the death was not linked to the felony, the result would only have
been the reduction of the conviction to second degree murder. Unfor-
tunately, the court has continued to cloud rather than clarify these
different issues by citing but not distinguishing first and second degree
murder cases involving felonies. As a first degree murder case, Schilling
involved not the problems of causation and mens rea associated with
felony murder cases, but rather the problem of concurrence between
the armed robbery and the killing for the purpose of determining qual-
ification for the death penalty.
State v. Matthews,44 a case of second degree murder not involving
an aggravated felony, did raise an issue of causuation. The defendant
and a companion beat the victim at an isolated location and, thinking
her dead, left her on a slope above a canal. The victim was found
floating in a canal; the immediate cause of death was determined to be
drowning. The court affirmed a conviction for second degree murder,
labelling the defendant's act the "legal cause" of death. The defendant's
acts constituted a "but for" cause, which the court characterized as a
contributing cause. 4 Although the defendant did not drown the victim
and apparently did not intend the victim to drown, he was the legal
cause of death. The defendant intended to kill the victim and thought
he had done so; that the immediate cause of death was drowning did
not relieve him from liability for the death. It could have been otherwise
if another person, acting independently of the defendant, had later come
along and pushed the victim into the water. 46 In the absence of an
"independent" intervening cause, the defendant was responsible for the
consequences of the beating and abandonment because death was the
harm intended. Although the court's use of the word "contributory
cause" may be somewhat misleading, 47 the court was clearly correct in
finding the defendant's act to be the legal cause of the death.
44. 450 So. 2d 644 (La. 1984).
45. Id. at 647.
46. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra note 37, at 782-85.
47. See Baker, supra note 41, at 372-73.
[Vol. 45
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84
DEFENSES-THE AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE
The defenses of self-defense 4 and the defense of others49 are limited
by the aggressor doctrine, which requires an aggressor to retreat before
he can regain the right of defense.50 Thus if A strikes B and B strikes
back, A cannot claim self-defense on a second blow because he initiated
the whole affair. While this much is clear, a problem arises in the case
of an escalating response. If A strikes B with non-deadly force and B
responds with deadly force, it is clear that the response of B has been
excessive. In such circumstances, B's excessive response is unreasonable
and, he is therefore not entitled to claim self-defense. Under these
circumstances, would A, the original aggressor, ever have the right
immediately to defend his life without retreat? If A is able to retreat,
it is reasonable to require him to do so. But should the aggressor
doctrine deny A the benefit of self-defense if (1) he fails to retreat
because to do so would endanger his life, or if (2) able to retreat, he
nevertheless does not. A literal application of the Code articles would
deny A the right of self-defense even in the 'case when he is unable to
retreat.51
In State v. Gonday,52 on a manslaughter conviction, the first circuit
confronted such a situation, although it was further complicated in that
the defendant was acting to defend another person. The victim had been
riding in a car which struck a truck driven by the defendant and carrying
a passenger. The defendant pursued and forced the victim's car off the
road. Although the circumstances were less than clear, the court assumed
that defendant stood outside his truck with a shotgun while his com-
panion-passenger approached the driver of the other car. When the
companion reached to take the keys out of the automobile, the driver
of the automobile reached for a gun and apparently attempted to shoot
the defendant's companion. The defendant shot and killed the driver
of the automobile with a shotgun blast. The court acknowledged that
when the defendant shot the victim, the defendant might have been
considered the aggressor for having chased the victim.53 However, the
court thought that the defendant's actions made him the aggressor only
with regard to a reasonable response by the victim.54 In other words,
48. La. Crim. Code art. 19; La. Crim. Code art. 20 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
49. La. Crim. Code art. 22.
50. La. Crim. Code art. 21.
51. "A person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the
right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a
manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and
discontinue the conflict." La. Crim. Code art. 21.
52. 442 So. 2d 703 (La. App. 1st. Cir. 1983).
53. Id. at 706.
54. Not every act of a defendant will make him an aggressor. Is it the character
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at least for so long as the victim himself was acting reasonably in terms
of his own right of self-defense, the aggressor did not have the right
of defending himself or others without the necessary retreat. Finding,
however, the victim's action unreasonable because he used a gun to
respond to non-deadly aggression, the court determined that the de-
fendant was not the aggressor for purposes of the homicide.
While the court's construction of the facts in this case may be open
to question, its approach to the statute generally appears to be a rea-
sonable one. The underlying principle for all the defenses of person
and property is that the persons involved must act reasonably, which
means that the preservation of life must have the highest priority. Just
as the Code limits the taking of life in self-defense to circumstances
when the defendant has a reasonable belief of "imminent danger of
losing his life" and that the killing is "necessary to save himself from
that danger," 5 the same principle of reasonableness should be applied
to the aggressor doctrine. When a non-deadly aggressor faces a poten-
tially deadly response, the original aggressor's right to self-defense should
turn on whether he has the opportunity to retreat safely. The Code
requires the aggressor to retreat and, as long as he has the opportunity
to do so, it is reasonable to hold him to that requirement. Moreover,
it is reasonable to hold him strictly to the requirement because he must
take into account the fact that the victim who reacts with only marginally
excessive force may have understood the non-deadly aggression in terms
of a threat to his life. Thus, the Code imposes an unqualified requirement
that the aggressor retreat. In the more difficult situation of a non-
deadly aggressor who receives a clearly excessive response which threatens
his life where he has no opportunity to retreat, it would seem unrea-
sonable for the non-deadly aggressor not to have a defense if he acts
to save his life. The statute's unqualified language, however, makes no
provision for such a situation. Without inserting an exception to the
language of the statute, another way of reaching this result, as did the
court in Gonday, is to say that the non-deadly aggressor is no longer
the aggressor when he meets an excessive response threatening his life.
of the act coupled with the intent of the defendant that determines whether the
defendant is the aggressor ....
The act of aggression which would thereafter preclude asserting the right of
self-defense must be such that the response elicted from the victim by the
aggressive act can be termed a reasonable response to that act.' If a defendant
curses a victim and the victim pulls a gun to kill the defendant certainly the
defendant is not precluded by the original aggressive act of cursing from killing
the victim in order to save his own life. Under these circumstances the victim's
response to the aggressive acts would be unreasonable.
442 So. 2d at 706. Footnote 4 states: "The Civil Law clearly supports this proposition.
Tripoli v. Gurry, 253 La. 473, 218 So. 2d 563 (1969); Mut v. Roy, 185 So. 2d 639 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1966); Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932)."
Id.
55. La. Crim. Code art. 20 (1974 & Supp. 1984).
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Gonday is complicated by the fact that the defendant was acting
not in self-defense but in the defense of another. One may if necessary
"kill in the defense of another person when it is reasonably apparent
that the person attacked could have justifiably used such means himself
.... ,,56 Thus if A attempts to defend B, A must be concerned with
whether it is "reasonably apparent" that B is not the aggressor or, if
the aggressor, has retreated. In Gonday, the court's interpretation of
the facts was that the person defended was not the aggressor and
therefore had no duty to retreat. 7 The case thus avoids the more difficult
situation of a killing in defense of a person who has been a non-deadly
aggressor and fails to retreat when it is reasonably apparent that he
had an opportunity to do so."' It would seem unreasonable to recognize
a defense of another in the same situation. It might seem that since
(under Gonday) the non-deadly aggressor is not considered an aggressor
for purposes of a deadly response, he has no duty to retreat. The ability
but failure to retreat, however, would remain a factor to be considered
by the jury in determining the right to self-defense, and derivatively the
right of a defendant to kill in defense of others.5 9
ARMED ROBBERY
In robbery, the doctrine of concurrence requires that the "defend-
ant's acts of violence or intimidation must occur either before the taking
• . . or at the time of the taking."' 6 The concurrence of force with
the taking distinguishes robbery, a crime against the person, from theft,
a crime against property. In situations where the force appears to occur
as part of the getaway rather than the taking, courts sometimes stretch
the facts to connect the force to the taking in ways that are questionable.
Where a weapon is used only in the getaway, however, the facts may
establish an armed robbery as long as the evidence also shows the use
of some other force to effect the taking. In State v. Bridges,61 the taking
"by use of force" and the "while armed with a dangerous weapon"
elements are not clearly distinguished. The court finds the use of the
weapon during the getaway sufficient to make out the elements of armed
robbery, even though it notes that the weapon had not been used to
take possession of the money. Connecting the use of the gun to the
robbery is an issue distinct from connecting the force or intimidation
to the theft even though in many cases use of a weapon satisfies both
56. La. Crim. Code art. 22 (emphasis added).
57. The court said the "case cannot be analyzed as one involving an aggressor who
has withdrawn from the conflict, because the victim did not give Williams or Gonday the
opportunity to withdraw." Nevertheless, it indicates that even if the person defended had
been the aggressor, he had clearly retreated. 442 So. 2d at 706 n.5.
58. See id.
59. La. Crim. Code art. 20 & comments (1974 & Supp. 1984).
60. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 37, § 94 at 701.
61. 444 So. 2d 721 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
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elements. In this case there was evidence of force to effect the taking,
separate and apart from the use of the gun. While the robbery may
continue for certain purposes until the escape has been completed, 62 if
force or intimidation had not been used to effect the taking, the evidence
would have established only a theft, not a robbery. 63
In State v. Thomas,64 the supreme court did face the issue of
concurrence between the theft and the force or intimidation. In Thomas,
a simple robbery case, the court found that the taking had been ac-
companied not by force, but by "intimidation" when the defendants,
posing as police officers, pulled an automobile over, conducted a search,
and took money. Although the victims were intimidated by the actions
of the imposters, they did not discover until later that the defendants
had taken money from the victim's truck. Over a strong dissent by
Justice Blanche, the court determined that the taking had been through
intimidation. Justice Blanche argued persuasively that the court had
failed to distinguish properly between robbery and the crimes of theft
and extortion. 65
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Thomas turns
on whether the victim must be aware that the force or intimidation is
the means to effect the taking. The statutory language, "theft . . . by
use of force or intimidation," and the common understanding of armed
robbery reflect the notion that the victim gives up property or fails to
resist the taking of property because faced with a threat to his person.
In Thomas, the facts indicate that the taking resulted from the misre-
presentation of the defendants rather than from intimidation. While the
victims were generally intimidated, the evidence recited in the opinion
reflects that they did not connect the intimidation to the theft until
after it had been completed. Although there is authority to support the
view that such a situation constitutes robbery,66 the fact that the intim-
idation was not directed to the taking suggests that a theft, rather than
a robbery, occurred.
62. The court observed that "the three armed themselves not so much to take
possession of the money, but to ensure that they could get away without resistance from
the victims." 444 So. 2d at 726.
63. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 37, § 94, at 701; but see R. Perkins & R.
Boyce, supra note 37, at 349.
64. 447 So. 2d 1053 (La. 1984).
65. 447 So. 2d at 1056-58 (Blanche, J., dissenting).
66. State v. Parson, 44 Wash. 299, 87 P. 349 (1906). Perkins and Boyce cite the
case for the proposition that:
One may be intimidated into parting with his property without consent by being
required to submit to a fraudulent assertion of authority. Robbery was com-
mitted, it was held, when rogues pretending to be police officers arrested a
man, required him to accompany them, searched him and took money from
his pockets under a false pretense of authority.
R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra note 37, at 348 (footnotes omitted).
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